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THEORY OF MIND AND THE FRONTAL LOBES
Glauco C. Igliori1, Benito P. Damasceno2
ABSTRACT - Background: Theory of mind (ToM) is the ability to attribute mental states to other individu-
als. Its cerebral organization is not enough established, even though the literature suggests the relevant
role of the frontal lobes. Objective: To evaluate frontal lobe patients and controls in ToM tests. M e t h o d :
We studied 20 patients with lesions limited to the frontal lobes (as shown by CT or MRI), and 10 norm a l
control subjects by means of ToM tests (recognizing himself in mirrors, false belief, first and second order
ToM tasks), as well as tests of other cognitive functions (counter- p ro o f s ) . Results: Patients and contro l s
performed similarly in ToM tests. There was significant difference between frontal subgroups (left, right,
b i f rontal) in the double-bluff task (second order ToM) (p=0.021), without relation to verbal fluency (p=0.302)
or delayed recall ability (p=0.159). The only two patients with deficits in ToM tasks had impairment of social
b e h a v i o r. Conclusion: F rontal lesions do not necessarily implicate in ToM deficits, which may occur when
such lesions are associated to disturbance of social behavior.
KEY WORDS: theory of mind, frontal lesions, cognition, neuropsychological tests.
Teoria da mente e lobos frontais
RESUMO - Contexto: Teoria da mente (TM) é a capacidade de atribuir estados mentais aos outros. Sua org a-
nização cerebral não está suficientemente esclarecida, embora a literatura indique que os lobos fro n t a i s
desempenham papel re l e v a n t e . Objetivo: Avaliar pacientes com lesões frontais e controles em testes de
T M . Método: Foram estudados 20 pacientes com lesões restritas aos lobos frontais (conforme imagens
de CT ou RM) e 10 controles normais em testes de TM (reconhecimento da própria imagem no espelho,
falsa crença, TM de 1ª ordem e TM de 2ª ordem), usando como contra-provas testes de outras funções cog-
n i t i v a s . Resultados: Não houve diferença entre pacientes e controles nos testes de TM. Os subgru p o s
f rontais (direito, esquerdo, bilateral) diferiram significativamente no teste de “duplo blefe” (TM 2ª ord e m )
(p=0,021), sem relação com a fluência verbal (p=0,302) ou memória de evocação tardia (p=0,159). As úni-
cas duas pacientes com déficits em testes TM tinham alterações do comportamento social. C o n c l u s ã o :
Lesões frontais não implicam necessariamente em transtornos da TM, os quais podem ocorrer quando tais
lesões estão associadas a alterações do comportamento social. 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: teoria da mente, lesões frontais, cognição, testes neuropsicológicos.
The human beings are social animals, which need
to interact to each other for survival. Their success in
such interactions is highly dependent on the so called
“social intelligence”, which gives us the power to
i n t e r p ret the behavior of other individuals, attribute
mental states to them, make inferences about their
intentions, desires and believes, and predict their ac-
tions. This ability to conceive the mental state of oth-
ers is called “theory of mind”1. Theory of mind (To M )
is a complex function, which seems to have its own
cognitive mechanisms, since it may be selectively im-
p a i red when other cognitive functions are intact, as
seen in autistic childre n2 , 3; or it may be selectively p re-
s e rved when other cognitive functions are disturbed,
as shown in children with Down´s or Williams´ s y n d ro-
m e s4. Furt h e rm o re, ToM seems to be a general human
a b i l i t y, since it is found in all culture s5, and has a se-
quential pattern of development in children6,7.
In the ontogenesis of ToM, the first step is to be
able to recognize himself as being separated fro m
the other, to understand that himself and the other
a re distinct individuals. On the other hand, the child
p e rceives similarities in himself and others, then being
able to recognize the other and consequently him-
self as intentional beings. Just in this way can the c h i l d
engage himself in joint attention activities with oth-
ers, probably after nine months age8, or accord i n g
to other authors9 , 1 0, after 18 months age. With this
a b i l i t y, the child can engage himself in a triadic re l a-
tionship with the other individual (adult) and the
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object of their attention, coordinating their interac-
tions (the child sees a toy and sees that his mother
also sees it). Next stage in the development of To M
(after 18 months age) is pretense play, which re q u i re s
the ability to uncouple simulation from re a l i t y6. At
this age, the child begins to understand the desire
of others (“John wants to eat”), before understand-
ing the belief of others (“John believes that I ate a
candy”).
Later on, between 3 and 4 years age, the child be-
comes able to understand that the others can have
beliefs or false beliefs7. In false belief tests, the child
thinks that the other person may have a false belief.
He/she can re p resent the mental state of another p e r-
son, making inferences about the belief of this per-
son, conceived as diff e rent from his/her own belief
in the real state of the world1 1. This ability is called
“first order ToM”.
Between 6 and 7 years age, the child begins to
understand that the other person can also re p re s e n t
the mental state of other persons (beliefs about
b e l i e f s )1 2. Thus, the child can make inferences not on-
ly on the belief a person has about an event in the
world, but also on the belief this person has about
the belief of another person concerning this world
event. This is the “second order ToM”. First ord e r
ToM may be expressed as “A thinks that B did x”; and
second order ToM, as “A thinks that B thinks that A
did x”.
The cerebral organization of ToM is not enough
established. However, such a complex mental func-
tion is probably carried out by a neurofunctional net-
work engaging various brain regions and mental ope-
r a t i o n s1 3. In this re g a rd, the frontal lobes seem to p l a y
a crucial role, as revealed by studies of normal sub-
jects using functional neuro i m a g i n g1 4, as well as eval-
uation of frontal lobe patients on ToM tests1 3 , 1 5 - 1 7.
Other brain regions seem to be also engaged, part i-
cularly the temporal-parietal junction1 8 , 1 9, and the
left amygdala2 0. ToM can also be disrupted by diff u s e
brain lesions with dementia21.
As yet, it is not known how and in what degre e
a bilateral or unilateral frontal lobe lesion can impair
ToM. With the aim to contribute to this knowledge,
we have studied frontal lobe patients and norm a l
control subjects by means of tests for ToM tests and
relevant cognitive functions (counter-proofs).
METHOD
Subjects – This study included 20 patients with ages
higher than 18 years, even illiterate ones, attended at our
university hospital (Unit for Neuropsychology and Neuro-
linguistics, HC-UNICAMP), as well as 10 normal control sub-
jects. The inclusion of controls re q u i red them to be matched
to the patients by age, sex, education and handedness, as
well as to have normal neurological exam and no pre v i o u s
h i s t o ry or current symptoms of neurological or psychiatric
diseases (neuroimaging was not re q u i red). All patients had
lesions limited to the frontal lobes, in chronic phase (≥4
months after lesion onset), as shown by computerized to-
mography (CT) or magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). This
study was approved by our Medical School Ethics Committee
and all patients and controls signed the informed consent
form.
P ro c e d u res – All patients and controls underwent med-
ical history, neurological examination, Mini-Mental Status
Exam (MMSE)2 2 , 2 3, besides tests for ToM and cognition. The
following cognitive functions were examined as counter-
proofs for ToM tests: attention (Digit Span, a WAIS-R sub-
t e s t )2 4; visual-spatial perception (Luria´s Neuro p s y c h o l o g i c a l
B a t t e ry and Ratcliff´s mental rotation tests)2 5 , 2 6; language
(Boston Naming Te s t )2 7; executive functions: verbal fluen-
cy (category: animals) and Stroop test2 8; and delayed re c a l l
of word list (Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Te s t )2 9. ToM tests,
whose scores were 1 (correct) or 0 (incorrect), included:
1. Mirror test3 0 , 3 1 to evaluate the subject’s ability to re c-
ognize himself in the mirror.
2. False belief test2 to verify if the subject is able to infer
that another person may have a wrong (false) belief, dif-
f e rent from his own. The story of Sally and Anne is played
by actors and presented in video-TV. Sally puts an object in
a place in the presence of Anne, and goes out from the sta-
ge scenery. Anne changes the place of the object while Sally
was out. Sally comes back to stage and, then, the examin-
er asks the subject “where Sally thinks the object is placed”.
3. Understanding ToM stories: In these tests, the exam-
iner reads the story and the subject has to retell it soon af-
t e rw a rds. If the subject forgets relevant events, the story
is read again to him (her) up to three more attempts. Failure
to remember relevant events in the fourth attempt excludes
the subject from the test.
3.1. First order ToM story1 6: This tests the subject’s abil-
ity to explain the behavior of a character by attributing
mental state to him. Story: “A burglar who has just ro b b e d
a shop is making his getaway. As he is running home, a poli-
ceman on his beat sees him drop his glove. He does not
know the man is a burg l a r, he just wants to tell him he
dropped his glove. But when the policeman shouts out to
the burg l a r, ‘Hey, you! Stop!’, the burglar turns round, sees
the policeman and gives himself up. He puts his hands up
and admits that he did the break-in at the local shop.”
Questions: (1) Why did the burglar surrender?; (2) Did the
policeman know that the man was a burglar?
3.2. Second order ToM stories: To verify if the subject
can understand what a character thinks about what anoth-
er character thinks about an event.
3.2.1. The examiner reads following story, adapted fro m
Stone et al.1 3: “Mary and John are sitting in the kitchen tal-
king. John is eating cookies. John gets up and leaves the
room. Mary closes up the box of cookies and puts them
away in a cabinet . While he is outside of the room, John
looks back through the keyhole and sees Mary moving the
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cookies. Mary goes back and sits down. The John opens the
d o o r.” Then, the examiner asks the subject: (1) Where does
Mary think that John thinks the cookies are? (belief ques-
tion); (2) Where are the cookies? (reality question); (3) Whe-
re were the cookies in the beginning? (memory question);
(4) Where does John think the cookies are?
3.2.2. The other story is a “double bluff” test3: “During
the war, the Red army captured a member of the Blue arm y.
They want him to tell them where his arm y ’s tanks are; they
know they are either by the sea or in the mountains. They
know that the prisoner will not want to tell them, he will
want to save his arm y, and so he will certainly lie to them.
The prisoner is very brave and very clever; he will not let
them find his tanks. The tanks are really in the mountains.
Now when the other side asks him where his tanks are, he
says, “They are in the mountains.” Questions: (1) Is it true
what the prisoner said?; (2) Where will the other army look
for his tanks?; (3) Why did the prisoner say what he said?
Data analysis – Data was analysed by means of statistical
s o f t w a re SAS System for Wi n d o w s3 2. Patients and contro l s
w e re compared for age, education, and cognitive tests by
means of Mann-Whitney U test and Kru s k a l - Wallis analysis
of variance, and for their perf o rmance on ToM tests by using
Fisher´s exact proof. Significance level was 5% (two-tailed).
RESULTS
The etiology was vascular in 11 patients, traumat-
ic in 7, surgical resection in 1, and tumor in 1 patient.
As shown by Tables 1 and 2, there was no significant
d i ff e rence between patients and controls concern-
ing age (p=0.081), education (p=0.964), MEEM score s
(p=0.609), Stroop test (p=0.147), and Boston Naming
Test (p=0.118), but they perf o rmed diff e rently in tests
of attention (p=0.0016), verbal fluency (p=0.0141),
and delayed recall (p=0.0272). Both groups perf o rm e d
similarly in ToM tests: false belief (p=0.532), first ord e r
ToM (p=0.1), second order ToM (p=1), inclusive “dou-
ble bluff” task (p=0.1107). Mirror test was carried out
correctly by all patients and controls.
Table 1. Demographic and cognitive data in patients and controls.
Patients Group Sex Age Educ MMSE Attent VF Stroop BNT DRM
1 L M 63 4 29 4 9 5 56 04
2 L F 73 4 28 5 16 6 57 07
3 L M 30 11 28 4 10 1 54 09
4 L F 22 4 24 5 15 3 50 07
5 L F 48 15 28 6 11 0 59 03
6 L M 21 10 30 7 10 6 48 08
7 L F 53 9 21 5 4 17 27 05
8 L M 69 3 18 6 6 ND 39 00
9 R F 46 11 28 7 20 1 55 09
10 R F 58 0 22 4 13 ND 38 07
11 R M 58 4 21 5 6 ND 50 00
12 R M 70 5 16 3 11 ND ND 03
13 R M 49 6 24 6 7 6 35 01
14 BiF M 50 7 30 6 22 0 58 04
15 BiF F 33 8 26 5 10 1 51 06
16 BiF F 44 0 16 4 10 ND 36 01
17 BiF M 72 3 20 3 4 ND 20 00
18 BiF M 44 8 27 6 17 1 50 05
19 BiF M 51 5 27 6 15 2 39 09
20 BiF M 63 8 29 6 13 12 48 06
Mean±SD 50.8±15.6 6.2±3.8 24.6±4.6 5.1±1.2 11.4±4.9 4.3±4.9 45.1±10.7 4.7±3.1
Controls
1 M 38 4 29 9 11 1 54 11
2 F 20 8 23 9 17 0 53 12
3 M 53 4 24 8 17 1 49 05
4 M 21 5 28 8 22 5 51 13
5 M 57 4 28 7 15 1 53 03
6 F 50 15 26 9 21 0 59 13
7 F 31 7 27 7 15 4 48 10
8 M 42 8 28 6 17 5 56 06
9 F 40 0 22 4 11 ND 39 03
10 F 53 9 27 6 13 0 52 08
Mean±SD 40.5±13.2 6.4±4.1 26.2±2.4 7.3±1.6 15.9±3.7 1.9±2.1 51.4±5.4 8.4±3.9
p 0.0819 0.9646 0.6097 0.0016 0.0141 0.1477 0.1180 0.0272
L, left; R, right; BiF, bifrontal; ND, not done; Educ, education (years); MMSE, mini-mental status exam; VF, verbal fluency; Stroop, stroop test;
Attent, attention; BNT, Boston naming test; DRM, delayed recall memory; SD, standard deviation; P, p value (patients versus controls).
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The frontal subgroups (right, left, and bifrontal)
w e re similar concerning demographic and cognitive
data. As shown in Tables 2 and 3, eight patients were
excluded from “double bluff” test, three from 1s t o r-
der and two from 2nd order ToM tests, because they
did not fulfil criteria for perf o rming these tests. A-
mong the ToM tests, the only one in which these sub-
g roups perf o rmed diff e rently was on the “double
b l u ff” task (p=0.021) (Table 3). Perf o rmance on this
test was not influenced by delayed recall (p=0.1597)
or verbal fluency (p=0.3022).
DISCUSSION
The ToM tests we employed presented varied
d e g ree of diff i c u l t y. The mirror test off e red no pro b-
lem to our subjects. Difficulties appeared with sto-
ries re p resenting less familiar situations, as happened
with the double bluff story (test 3.2.2) about a war,
but not with the other second order ToM story (test
3.2.1) portraying the scene on a couple in the kitchen.
These diff e rences in familiarity may, at least part l y,
explain the difficulties which two of our cases (num-
Table 2. Results of ToM tests in patients and controls.
Patients Group Mirror False 1st order 2nd order Double
test belief ToM ToM bluff
1 L 1 1 1 1 0
2 L 1 1 1 1 0
3 L 1 1 1 1 1
4 L 1 1 1 1 0
5 L 1 1 1 1 ND
6 L 1 1 1 1 1
7 L 1 0 0 0 0
8 L 1 0 0 1 ND
9 R 1 1 1 1 1
10 R 1 1 ND 1 ND
11 R 1 ND ND ND ND
12 R 1 1 0 1 ND
13 R 1 1 1 1 ND
14 BiF 1 1 1 1 1
15 BiF 1 1 1 1 1
16 BiF 1 0 0 0 ND
17 BiF 1 1 ND ND ND
18 BiF 1 1 1 1 1
19 BiF 1 1 1 1 1
20 BiF 1 1 1 1 1
Controls
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1
3 1 1 1 1 ND
4 1 1 1 1 1
5 1 1 1 1 1
6 1 1 1 1 1
7 1 1 1 1 1
8 1 1 1 1 1
9 1 1 1 1 ND
10 1 1 1 1 1
L, left; R, right; BiF, bifrontal; ND, not done.
Table 3. Comparison of frontal subgroupos in ToM tests (Fisher´s exact probability test).
Tests Right frontal Left frontal Bifrontal p
Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect
False belief 4 0 6 2 6 1 0.7688
1st order ToM 2 1 6 2 5 1 0.5357
2nd order ToM 4 0 7 1 5 1 1.0000
Double bluff 1 0 2 4 5 0 0.0210
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ber 8 and 12; see Table 2) had to perf o rm the first
o rder ToM story (on the burglar) but not the second
o rder one (on Mary and John in the kitchen). The
cognitive tests were chosen to verify if the failure in
ToM task was secondary to impairment of some rel-
evant cognitive function. For example, a subject may
fail in the false belief test due to an attention deficit,
without his ToM ability being primarily affected. In
the same way, other ToM tasks re q u i re intact visual
perception, language and executive functions. 
The performance of our frontal patients on ToM
tests was not significantly diff e rent from that of con-
t rols. This finding is in disagreement with that of oth-
er authors1 3 , 1 5 - 1 7, which found ToM impairment asso-
ciated to frontal lesions, probably because these au-
thors, though using smaller samples, included only
cases with lesions limited to the orbital-frontal or
dorsal-lateral region, all cases presenting disturbances
of social behaviour. Another plausible explanation
for our findings is probably because other brain are a s
may compensate for the deficiency of frontal re g i o n s .
In this re g a rd, some studies1 8 , 1 9 have shown the re l-
evant role played by the temporal-parietal junction
cortex, which was intact in our patients.
In our study, the only two patients (number 7 and
16; see Table 2) with low performance on ToM tests
p resented severe postlesional behavioural changes,
which impeded them to perf o rm their occupational
activities or to dwell independently. On the other
hand, none patient or control with good perf o rm a n-
ce on ToM tests had disturbances of social behaviour.
These findings suggest that frontal lesions may cause
ToM deficits when associated to behavioural changes.
The majority of our patients had no impairment of
ToM or social behaviour.
Our study had some limitations. We had difficul-
ties re c ruiting enough number of patients with le-
sions restricted to the frontal regions, as usually hap-
pens with studies of frontal lobe patients. Our fro n t a l
g roup was heterogeneous, as re g a rds both etiology
( v a s c u l a r, traumatic, surgical resection) and lesion dis-
tribution, not restricted to the dorsal-lateral or medi-
al-basal regions. More o v e r, lesion localization by
means of CT is not precise enough, particularly in t r a u-
matic cases. On the other hand, the sample size was
small, what weakens the statistical power, even using
non-parametric tests. In spite of all these limitations,
we can conclude that frontal lesions do not necessa-
rily implicate in ToM impairment, which may occur
when such lesions are associated to disturbances of
social behaviour.
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